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Abstract
As a particular form of transparency, nowadays some central banks publish
their interest rate forecasts while many others refuse to do that. Whether the
publication is good or bad for economic performance and social welfares is
now a hotly debatable subject. This paper provides a review of the literature
in both theoretical and empirical aspects. We also establish a criteria table
which could be used as a preliminary guideline for central banks in answering
the question whether they should reveal the forecasts, and how to publish
the policy rate inclinations. The suggested conclusion is that interest rate
projections should be considered as one of the last items that central banks
should reveal and they should be very careful in publishing its policy rate
forecasts.
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‘If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.’
- Alan Greenspan
1 Introduction
Prior to 1990s, central banks were masked in secrecy. A common ac-
knowledgement in central banking circles held that monetary policymakers
should say as little as possible, and say it mysteriously1. When central banks
became more independent, the accountability arguments led central banks
to be transparent. In the last ten years, many central banks have become
more transparent and this is likely to be the main stream both in theoretical
and actual operation of central banks.
Many central banks publish their macroeconomic projections for the econ-
omy and the future values of key variables such as inflation, GDP growth or
unemployment as forms of transparency. However, there are currently only a
few central banks around the world which have practical experience in pub-
lishing macroeconomic projections based on endogenous interest rate pro-
jections (EIRPs) and publishing the interest rate forecasts themselves. The
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ, since June 1997), Norges Bank (since
November 2005) and Sveriges Riksbank (since February 2007) currently pub-
lish endogenous interest rate forecasts. Banco de la Republica Colombia used
to publish such a forecast (from December 2003 to June 2004). EIRP has
recently started to be published in the Central Bank of Iceland (March 2007)
and the Bank of Israel (July 2007).
As now standardized, the modern monetary policy is all about guiding
and influencing the public’s expectations. Private agents make decisions
about consumption, investment, labor supply, and price settings etc. not
basing on the current interest rate but on their expectations of future rates,
together with their adjustments for risks. That is, the current policy rate
is most relevant to the extent it conveys information about future policy
settings and influences longer-maturity interest rates. Accordingly, at its
1See Blinder et al. (2008)
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core, monetary policy can be considered a process of shaping the entire yield
curve of interest rates in order to achieve various macroeconomic objectives2.
Since the (nominal, fundamental) interest rate is the most direct tool that
central bank has nearly full control on, it seems natural that central banks
should consider publishing their policy rate projections as the most direct
form of transparency3. Therefore, the small number of central banks doing
that must raise a question whether revealing interest rate forecasts is good
or bad for central banks and for economic performance.
Among the huge literature on effects of central bank transparency (in
general form), there are surprisingly few papers about publishing interest
rate forecasts as a specific form of transparency. Nevertheless, this issue is
rapidly increasing in the centre of monetary policy debates. Theoretically,
Rudebusch and Williams (2006) and Gosselin et al. (2008) are the pioneers.
Using a New-Keynesian log-linear form model including a Phillips curve, a
forward-looking IS curve and a central bank loss function, Rudebusch and
Williams (2006) examine the macroeconomic effects of direct revelation of a
central bank’s expectations about the future path of the policy rate. They
show that, in an economy where private agents have imperfect information
about the determination of monetary policy, central bank communication of
interest rate projections can help shape financial market expectations and
may improve macroeconomic performance. Employing a similar setup, Gos-
selin et al. (2008) show that the publishing of central bank’s interest rate
forecasts will align central bank and private sector expectations about the
future inflation rate, however there exist some conditions where opacity may
be creative and raise welfare. Recently, Brzezina and Kot (2008) use a cost-
benefit analysis approach with calibrations to explain that the gains from
publishing interest rate paths are small relative to those from publishing
other macroeconomic projections to provide a reason for the hesitation of
central banks.
Given the fact that only few countries have experiences in publishing
2See Rudebusch and Williams (2006)
3Recently the debate on the need of QE when central banks cannot reach their target
via interest rate channel has been raised, especially in the UK and US
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interest rate projections, the number of empirical papers in this stream is ex-
pectedly small. Ferrero and Secchi (2007) use a panel data of New Zealand,
Norway, the US and the euro area to provide a conclusion that the announce-
ment of future policy intentions, in either quantitative or qualitative form,
will improve the ability of market operators to predict monetary decisions.
Archer (2005), Filacek et al. (2007), Rudebusch (2008) are among some
other economists that analyses the effects of revealing the policy inclinations
without employing econometric models. Their general conclusion is that this
specific form of central bank transparency is desirable, although there are
still possibilities of decreasing welfare caused by the publications of future
interest rate forecasts. Some of them study the capacity of particular central
banks in implementing the revelations4. However, neither of them provides
a complete set of criteria for central banks to assess their own readiness for
attending the group of pioneer banks.
This paper is to provide a review of the literature on publishing central
bank’s interest rate projections in both theoretical and empirical aspects.
Examining the main arguments on pros and cons of the revealing policy
inclinations, we will establish a criteria table for central banks to consider in
answering the questions: Should they publish the interest rate forecasts? And
if yes, how should they do? The bottom line suggestion is that publishing
future policy inclinations is a double-edged knife which central banks should
consider as one of the last forms of transparency and must be very careful in
use.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides
main arguments on the pros and cons of the revealing. A table of criteria for
publishing interest rate forecasts is recommended in Section 3. Conclusions
on the complexity of the problem with some suggestions for future research
will be in Section 4.
4See Filacek et al. (2007)
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2 The arguments on the pros and cons of
publishing interest rate forecasts
2.1 Theoretical frameworks and empirical results
We first examine the available theoretical frameworks for analyzing the
effects of publishing policy inclinations. From Woodford (2003), a set of
log-linearized New Keynesian model is now-standard used for the analysis.
Rudebusch and Williams (2006) use a model including 3 key equations:
 a New Keynesian Phillips curve
pit = βEtpit+1 + κ(yt + ut)
 a forward-looking IS curve
yt = −(it − Etpit+1 − r∗t ) + Etyt+1
 and a policy maker (central bank)’s loss function which is standard for
inflation and output variability
L = V AR(pit − pi∗t ) + λV AR(yt)
where yt is the output gap, it is the nominal interest rate, pit is the inflation
rate, r∗t is the natural rate of interest and Et denotes expectations conditional
on the information set available at time t; ut is a distortionarily stationary
shock to marginal cost, β is the rate of time preference, and κ measures the
sensitivity of inflation to the output gap; and λ is the relative weight on
output gap variability.
Their results show that revealing policy inclinations (interest rate projec-
tions) can help align the public’s and the central bank’s expectations of future
policy actions, and thus reduce the magnitude of fluctuations in output and
inflation, which is equal to reducing the policymaker’s loss. The benefits of
central bank communication of interest rate projections are greatest when
the public has relatively little data. However, they also indicate that the
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benefits of central bank communication are muted if the public systemati-
cally underestimates the accuracy of the projections. In worse case, if the
public severely overestimates the accuracy of the central bank signals, then
the publication can be counterproductive until private agents realize their
misperception of the accuracy. This second part of the conclusion is some-
how similar to the one raised by Morris and Shin (2002 and 2005) except for
the factor playing important role here is transmission noise, not the precision
of information itself.
Nevertheless, Rudebusch and Williams (2006) use two key assumptions
that might be too strong: (i) they assume that the central bank can commit
to future policy actions and therefore does not face a Barro-Gordon time in-
consistency problem; and (ii) they also ignore the strategic complementarity
which causes the problem of misleading information raised by Morris and
Shin (2002 and 2005). This seems to make the model be less than complete.
Similarly, Gosselin et al. (2008) use a set of three equations to examine
the conditions under which a central bank raises welfare by revealing its
expected future interest rate in a simple two-period model with heterogeneous
information between central bank and private sector:
 a New Keynesian Phillips curve
pit = βE
P
t pit+1 + κ1yt + εt
 a forward-looking IS curve
yt = E
P
t yt+1 − κ2(rt − EPt pit+1 − r∗t )
 and a policy maker (central bank)’s loss function which is standard for
inflation and output variability
L = E(pi21 + pi
2
2)
where yt is the output gap, rt is the nominal interest rate, and E
P
t denotes
private sector’s expectations conditional on the information set available at
time t.
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They calculate the loss function value in two themes where central bank
publishes or does not publish its interest projections. Comparing the two
results with possible relations between parameters, they show that a central
bank that follows an optimal linear interest rule will raise welfare by revealing
the future interest rate in two cases: (i) when central bank signal precision
is high enough relative to the private signal precision; and (ii) when the
elasticity of current to expected inflation is large and the relative signal and
early signal precision are not too low. The publishing will help align central
bank’s and private sector’s expectations about the future inflation rate. The
private sector fully trusts the central bank to eliminate future inflation and
sets the long-term interest rate accordingly, leaving only the unavoidable cen-
tral bank forecast error as a source of inflation volatility. Contrary, they also
show that opacity may welfare-dominate transparency (‘creative opacity’ ) if
the private sector’s own forecasts systematically offset the impact on infla-
tion volatility of the central bank forecast errors. This can be the case when
the early signals are precise relative to contemporaneous signals and when
the relative precision of the central bank information is not too large. In
other words, current period inflation differs from its target not just because
of the unavoidable central bank expectation error but also because central
bank and private sector expectations about future inflation and interest rates
are no longer aligned.
Recently, Brzezina and Kot (2008) employ a similar New-Keynesian model
with asymmetric information with some calibrations to show that publica-
tion of macroeconomic projections and of the future interest rate path by the
central bank can improve macroeconomic outcomes. However, their results
indicate that the gains from publishing interest rate paths are small rela-
tive to those from publishing macroeconomic projections. Given that most
inflation targeting central banks are already publishing macroeconomic pro-
jections this means that most gains from increasing transparency in this area
may already have been reaped. This means they use cost-benefit analysis to
provide a possible explanation of the relative reluctance of central banks to
publish interest rate paths.
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However, similar to the debate on the desirability of the transparency, as
pointed out in surveys by Geraats (2002) and Woodford (2005), many con-
clusions about the value of transparency appear to hinge on the exact speci-
fication of the theoretical models. The parameters calibrations are somewhat
ad-hoc and can be criticized as being lack of generalization.
Applying the problem of value of information raised by Morris and Shin
(2005) into the specific form of transparency, we can think of a ‘self-fulfilling
mechanism’ of central bank’s and private’s information, keeping in mind the
dual role of central bank as shaper and observer of the market. That is,
when private information is very accurate, and if the precision of central
bank signal (in the form of central bank’s interest rate forecasts) increases,
at a level that crowds out private information, agents take actions basing on
the over-weighted central bank information. Then the agents’ actions bear
less information value, or loosely reflect the true conditions of the economy.
Now, at the next period, forecasts becomes less accurate, since it is formed
basing on the signals of prices which are now less informative, until it returns
to a level that does not crowd out private information any more. From that
period, private information is not under-weighted and investors’ actions be-
come more informative. At the next period central bank forecasts gaining
more informativeness from market signals becomes more precise back, and
so on until its precision reaches the level that crowds out private informa-
tion again, and so on. We call this a ‘self-fulfilling mechanism’ of central
bank’s and private information which will maintain the relationship between
these types of information within a corridor in form like a sin-shape graph.
However, because learning is possible for both central bank and financial
market participants, this shape might have decreasing amplitudes overtime
and there will be no longer difference between central bank’s and private
sector’s forecasts in the infinity horizon (someday, all available information
become common knowledge).
As mentioned above, there has been no comprehensively empirical study
for the effects of publishing central bank’s interest rate forecasts except for
Ferrero and Secchi (2007). They find evidence that the communication of
future policy intentions, either quantitative or qualitative, improves the abil-
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Figure 1: ‘Self-fulfilling mechanism’ of central bank’s and private sector’s
interest rate forecasts
ity of market operators to predict monetary policy decisions. Analyzing the
case of Reserve Bank of New Zealand, which releases a quantitative assess-
ment of its future policy intentions since 1997, they show that even for a
very transparent central bank, the publication of the expected interest rate
path has a significant impact on market expectations. This result contra-
dicts to the one by Brzezina and Kot (2008) mentioned before. They also
find evidence that the change in market interest rates in the period included
between two publications of the interest rate path is similar to the revision
of the published path, thus suggesting that market operators have well un-
derstood the conditionality of the central bank’s projections. However, in
presence of changes in the direction of official interest rates, the reaction of
financial markets to the monetary news included in the publication of the
path is somehow anomalous: the change in market expected interest rate
goes in the opposite direction of that implied by the monetary news.
Beside some of the arguments supported by theoretical and empirical
studies mentioned in this parts, many other arguments raised by increasing
papers concentrating on the revealing of interest rate projections. Nothing
prevents us from borrowing the arguments on the pros and cons of central
bank transparency in general form or some other forms like inflation forecasts
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(which is conditionally based on a constant path of interest rate). However,
in the scope of this paper, we will only focus on the claims of the good and
bad of publishing policy rate inclinations in the next parts.
2.2 Why should central bank publish interest rate fore-
casts?
We now turn to reviewing the arguments that are in favor of ‘revealing
the secrets of the temple’. Many claims have not been empirically tested in
reality, however each of them includes a reasonable nuclear that is worthy to
study.
First, for the current wide-applied level of transparency, central bank pub-
lishes macroeconomic projections basing on the assumption that the policy
interest rate will not change in the future from its current setting. Private
agents must then compare this constant-interest-rate projection to the an-
nounced economic objectives in order to back out the actual expected policy
rate path. For example, if, at some future date, the published constant-
interest-rate inflation projection is higher (lower) than the inflation target,
then, in general, private agents should infer that the policy rate is likely to
increase (decrease). However, this implicit signaling procedure has been crit-
icized for supplying a circuitous, vague, and potentially confusing expression
of the central bank’s actual views of the likely path of policy5.
This leads to the second point which argues that publishing dynamic
interest rate may directly provide signals about future interest rate, then
affects market expectations about the future evolution of monetary policy
and, in turn, it allows the market to price financial assets more efficiently
(Archer, 2005; Kahn, 2007). This helps reduce uncertainty for other decision-
makers increasing the allocative efficiency of the economy6. As a result,
through the transmission process from expectations to the real actions, the
publication will help decrease the fluctuation of inflation and output, equally
5See Rudebusch and Williams (2006); and for the wider scope, see Rudebusch and
Svensson (1999), Goodhart (2001), Svensson (2005), Faust and Leeper (2005), and Wood-
ford (2005)
6See Tarkka and Mayes (1999)
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improve macroeconomic performance.
That is for the financial market. How about the central banks or poli-
cymakers, will they benefit themselves from their publications? It turns out
that the publication firstly can help to enforce the optimal policy under com-
mitment (Woodford, 2005; Archer, 2005; Kahn, 2007; Mishkin, 2004). Being
fear of the credibility and reputation problems, central banks must be more
careful if they want to deviate interest rates from the published levels. This
also increases the incentives of central banks for producing good forecasts
(Mishkin, 2004; Archer, 2005). In a deeper level, those fears will also foster
the discussion within the monetary policy committee on policy objectives
and on the appropriate models to be used in assessing the evolution of the
economy (Archer, 2005). In other words, it improves the co-ordination of
macroeconomic policies, and it provides a sort of democratic accountability
of a central bank via ongoing to a full transparency. All of the effects, in
turn, would help central bank implement its functions smoothly.
The experience of the RBNZ, which has given specific numerical pol-
icy guidance (point projections) for over a decade, is generally positive. As
discussed by Archer (2005), financial markets in New Zealand have reacted
favorably to the central bank’s interest rate forecasts, and understood their
conditionality. Although the Norges Bank has only a very brief track record
of interest rate projections, the explicit confidence bands (probabilistic pro-
jections) provided should reinforce forecast conditionality, and so far, its
experience has been favorable.
Moreover, supporting for a really full transparency, Svensson (2005) ar-
gues that the central bank should even publish its objective function and
model and thereby provide the public with all the information it needs to
form expectations of future policy actions. All the central bank informa-
tion will become common knowledge then. And because central banks are
assumed to have the best place with large number of qualified experts to
provide the best forecasts, the last problem remained would only be how to
react to sudden shocks.
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2.3 Why should not publish?
Among many papers, two main arguments have been raised against such
a publication of interest rate projections. The first is that it’s very difficult
to provide an accurate forward-looking policy inclination7, even for central
banks. Therefore, it may be very difficult to reach an agreement on the
future evolution of the interest rates within the monetary policy committee
(Goodhart, 2005; Mishkin, 2004). In many countries, there are usually draft
documents including policy rate forecasts prepared by central bank’s staff
for members of monetary policy committee before each committee’s meeting.
But each member may have own forecasts which may be very different to the
staff’s forecasts, as long as there is no common-accepted model. However,
as pointed out by Ferrero and Secchi (2007), although RBNZ’s and Norges
Bank’s forecasts are not significantly more precise than other central banks’
forecasts, they seem not to face any big problems caused by their forecast
publications.
The second main argument is that financial market participants may in-
evitably misinterpret the central bank’s signals. They are likely to misunder-
stand that the projections are central bank’s promises. It would be harmful if
the public does not understand the conditional nature of the forecasts, given
that it could undermine the credibility of the central bank when the real-
ized interest rates are different from the published ones. At least, publishing
central bank forecasts would make its communication to economic agents
become more complex (for further discussion, see Woodford, 2005; Mishkin,
2004; Rudebusch, 2008).
The third claim would follow immediately from the second one. Central
bank’s fearness of credibility and reputation problem arises. That, in turn,
affects the flexibility of central bank in forming future policy, especially in
dealing with unanticipated shocks. In other words, central bank is sticky
to what they told before about the future policy inclinations such that they
cannot flexibly and effectively react to unanticipated shocks in time.
The forth is that a publication of interest rate will be useless if the central
7See Rudebusch and Williams (2006)
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bank is already very transparent in many other dimensions, since in this case
the impact on private expectations could be minimal (Kahn, 2007). Or in
other words, gains from revealing interest rate forecasts are relatively small
compared to gains from publishing other macroeconomic projections (infla-
tion, output growth, unemployment, etc.) - the form that many inflation
targeting central bank have already reached in reality8.
Last, but not least, publishing interest rate projections means central
bank will give up their possibility of ‘creative opacity’ 9. Greenspan era has
shown that opacity sometimes is effective in forming expectations and pur-
suing stability in macroeconomic performance. This argument remains since
many central banks still consider the policy intentions as the last taboo of
the monetary policy10, ‘the last secret of the temple’ and therefore are re-
luctant to reveal them despite the fact that they are publishing many other
macroeconomic forecasts.
3 Criteria for central bank to publish future
interest rate paths
Through the above arguments on the pros and cons of publishing the
policy rate projections, the double-edge nature of the problem suggests that
a central bank should take careful steps in its deciding process for that kind
of publishing. We now are ready to turn to establishing a criteria table for
central banks in considering whether they should reveal the interest rate fore-
casts or not. This table however is only a preliminary assessment suggestion
for central banks and is far less than a complete guideline. Many criteria
included need to be strengthened and deepened through empirical studies.
8See Brzezina and Kot (2008)
9See Gosselin et al. (2008)
10See Rudebusch (2008)
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3.1 To answer the question: Publish or not?
Criteria Explanation
1. Central bank
1.1. Pre-conditions
Clear target regime A flexible inflation targeting might be the best
regime.
Relative independence Without independence, central banks cannot fore-
cast well and also cannot follow their policy inten-
tions smoothly
Good credibility level All publications will be useless if people do not
believe central bank’s communication
Good reputation level Central bank must have a believable experience of
keeping commitment in the past
Good accountability level Central bank itself must be aware of responsibility
for what it talks and what it does
1.2. Forecast accuracy
A good model for forecast-
ing interest rate
Model must account for key variables which af-
fect interest rate and must be potential to provide
good forecasts regardless it bears strong base of
economic relationships or not
Good models for forecasting
other macroeconomic vari-
ables
Models for forecasting inflation, output growth,
unemployment, etc., taking interest rate as en-
dogenous
Adaptiveness (learning) The models must be adjustable to increase the ac-
curacy of forecasts overtime. Always open for com-
peting forecasting models: compare and adapt,
even replace old, less efficient models.
Good data for putting into
the models
A good system and procedure of collecting and
checking data. Statistical requirements: not only
central bank internal statistical department but
also national statistical bureau for all necessary
macroeconomic variables
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Criteria Explanation
Qualified staff The department which prepares the forecast re-
ports must have highly qualified staff who can use
properly and efficiently the model and the data to
provide good results of forecasting
Quality control Control and checking procedures for assuring the
quality of each forecast
Qualified members of mon-
etary committee
The members of the monetary committee must
well understand the forecast process and results;
and must have ability to assess the forecasts pre-
pared by staff
Agreement within the com-
mittee
Clear and efficient procedure for reaching agree-
ment on current and future setting of interest rate
in the monetary committee
Ability to keep informed of
shocks
Ability to keep central bank itself and financial
market informed of any shock that affects interest
rate, inflation, output or any other key macroeco-
nomic variables
Ability to adjust to shocks Ability to adjust interest rate to bring inflation
rate toward the target of inflation, lower output
variability and stabilize other macroeconomic vari-
ables
1.3. Criteria for appropri-
ate interest rate path
See Qvigstad (2006)
Anchoring inflation expec-
tations
The interest rate must be set so that inflation ex-
pectations are around the target, then the realized
inflation moves towards the target
Getting the balance be-
tween inflation gap and out-
put gap
The two gaps should be kept in reasonable propor-
tion to each other
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Criteria Explanation
Robustness Interest rate should be robust to other assumptions
concerning economic developments and the func-
tioning of the economy (at least for few months
when new shocks do not come into effects)
Interest rate smoothing Interest rate should not be changed suddenly un-
less the credibility of the nominal anchor is threat-
ened
Financial imbalances Interest rate setting must be linked to asset price
and credit market and help keep stability in those
markets
Cross checks It is suggested to cross check the interest rate fore-
casts by some simple policy rules other than the
model in use
1.4. Feedback obtaining sys-
tems
Regular surveys Regular expectations observation system, etc.; ob-
serve level of using central bank’s forecasts
Observe other factors Observe asset prices, credit market, other financial
factors to check the process of reflecting expecta-
tions into reality factors
Assess efficiency level of us-
ing central bank’s forecasts
Evaluate the market participants’ use of central
bank forecasts in pricing and making decisions on
investment, consumption of economic agents
2. Financial market
participants
2.1. Understand the fore-
casts
An average-level agents should be able to fully un-
derstand the forecasts and know the meaning of
the forecasting results
2.2. Understand the con-
ditional nature of the fore-
casts
Agents will not underestimate or overestimate
the precision of central bank’s interest rate fore-
casts Central bank’s communication should be-
come ‘common understanding’ for being effective
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Criteria Explanation
2.3. Their own forecasting
systems
Agents might have their own private channel of
information which can be used together with com-
mon knowledge in forecasting
2.4. Ability to efficiently
use the forecast information
Agents might be able to use the revealed future in-
terest rate efficiently in pricing assets, investment,
consumption, borrowing, lending, etc.
3.2 To answer the question: How to publish?
Criteria Explanation
1. Language of the pub-
lication
Each word of the publication must be monitored
very carefully to avoid sending highly noisy signals
of future policy intentions that confuse markets
Keep agents aware Always repeat the conditional nature of the fore-
casts
Clear explanation on ad-
justments
Give clear reasons each time central bank has to
adjust interest rate in response to a significant
shock
2. Levels of revealing
Only qualitative statements Qualitative statements (about future interest rate)
sometimes make communication more complicated
and can lead to confusion
Some parts of numerical but
not full projection
Usually ad-hoc and in some special situations
Full forecast results As RBNZ, Norges Bank, Sveriges Bank and some
others are implementing. Might think of the fre-
quency: quarterly (in most cases), monthly, or
even weekly or daily; and also the form of the fore-
casts: point projections (as performed by RBNZ)
or probabilistic projections (Norges Bank)
Full forecast results and also
the models in use for fore-
casting
As suggested by Svensson (2005), however until
now no central bank has pursued this extremely
full transparency strategy
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Both the tables then can be improved simultaneously via 3 different di-
rections:
(i) expanding: put more criteria
(ii) detailing: give more detailed conditions into each of the criterion
(iii) quantifying: establish an index system to quantify the level of readiness
for each central bank to publish interest rate forecasts.
4 Conclusion
Whether central banks should publish their interest rate forecasts or not
is now a debatable topic that lies in the centre of the central bank trans-
parency. This paper is to provide a review of literature for the topic in both
theoretical and empirical aspects. Employing wide-accepted pros and cons
arguments, we try to establish a criteria table as a preliminary guideline for
central banks to assess their capacity to publish the policy rate intentions
and also how to do it if they choose to reveal. The bottom line is that,
because of the complication of the double-edged nature, publishing interest
rate projections should be one of the last forms of transparency that central
banks might use and they must be very careful when doing it.
Some directions are suggested for future research. Theoretically, a com-
monly accepted model which also control for time inconsistency (Barro -
Gordon problem) and value of public and private information (Morris and
Shin problem) is needed to develop in shedding light on the debate. Even
more necessary is empirical studies which collect available data from the
group of the most transparent central banks to analyze the full effects of the
forms of transparency (including all levels of revealing interest rate forecasts)
on the macroeconomic performance and social welfare. From those studies,
the criteria table in this paper will gain more fundamental bases and can be
expanded and deepened, providing a complete guidance for any monetary
policy maker in deciding whether to pursuit a full transparency and how to
do it smoothly.
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